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Herzl, Anti-semitism, and the Jewish State
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Too oen one finds oneself attempting to use realpolitik to make sense of Israeli 
policies towards the Palestinians of Israel and the territories it has occupied since 196⒎ 
Here I will argue that such policies, rather than being based on practical political 
strategies, are founded on an ontological project, operating om the earliest days of the 
Zionist project, in which the non-Jewish population of a Jewish state is treated, at best, as 
invisible and, more generally, as an internal enemy which must be contained, controlled, 
and eventually expelled. I contend that, before we can consider 'matrices of control' or 
'states of exception', we need to assess the distinctions on which practices of inclusion and 
exclusion are based; those between what Giorgio Agamben would term bios (human life) 
and zoe (bare or animal life)1. In the following paper I will, by examining the work of 
Theodor Herzl and its legacy to the state it played a key role in generating, show that 
Israel was initially conceived as a strategy for the extirpation of anti-semitism via the 
isolation and reformation of a particular category of Jew. In this the local non-Jewish 
populations were to be extraneous, expelled wherever possible and ghettoized when that 
proved impossible. In time Herzl's program of producing the 'new Jew' was to backfire, 
producing in the contemporary times a 'Jewish state' so internally heterodox that the 
category 'Jewish' can only be given commonality through a politics of fear based on the 
constant invocation of anti-semitism. It is here, I will contend, that the state's Palestinian 
population became essential to its functioning, being conceived as an antagonistic 
interiority whose threat had constantly to be revealed, counteracted and, one might say, 
provoked.
3* * *
One of the founding myths of the Zionist settler project was that it intended the 
indigenous non-Jewish population to benefit om the economic and cultural development 
European Jews would bring to the region2. Although subsequent phrases such as Golda 
Meir's 'there were no such thing as Palestinians'3 (1969), elaborated on by apologists such 
as Joan Peters in From Time Immemorial4 (1984), might lead one to question how local 
peoples were to be helped if they weren't to be recognized, there has been an assumption, 
informing, for instance, Britain's Mandate Period policies, that Zionism was meant not 
only to provide Jews with a homeland but also to provide a vanguard mechanism for 
improving the living standards and rights of the resident Arabs. 
Oen cited as evidence is Theodor Herzl's Altneuland (1902), a utopic portrayal of 
a future Jewish state in Palestine [sic]. At one point in that novel Rachid Bey, a Moslem 
neighbor of David Litwak, the Jew who guides the Prussian aristocrat Kingscourt around 
Haifa, responds to Kingscourt's query 'what happened to the old inhabitants of the land 
who possessed nothing -- the tenantry?':
'Those who had nothing could only gain. And gain they did: 
employment, better food, welfare. There was nothing more 
wretched than an Arab village of fellaheen at the end of the 
nineteenth century. The tenants lived in buildings not fit for cattle. 
The children were naked and uncared for, their playground the 
street. Today things are changed indeed….people are far better off 
than before; they are healthy, they have better food, their children 
go to school. Nothing has been done to interfere with their customs 
or their faith - they have only gained by welfare…‥The Jews have 
brought us wealth and health; why should we harbour evil thoughts 
about them? They live among us like brothers; why should we not 
3return their kindly feelings?….We Mohammedans have always been 
better iends with the Jews than you Christians' (Herzl 1960 [orig. 
1904]: 95 and 100).
This progressivist portrayal of a Moslem who had studied at the University of Berlin and 
was a full and active member of the Zionist 'New Society' suggests that Herzl's conception 
of relations between Jews and Palestinians in the future Zionist state was antithetical to 
the later vision of those who founded Israel on ethnic cleansing and expropriation and 
built it into the militaristic, oppressive and racist state it is today. This incommensurability 
suggests either that Herzl's heirs have radically subverted the legacy of the man popularly 
known as 'the Father of Zionism' or that Altneuland was deceptive in its intent, meant by 
Herzl to mask his real purpose in launching the Zionist state building project5. 
I want to argue here that the situation is more complicated, and that Herzl's own 
conception of the Jewish state was fundamentally split, with one trajectory -- perhaps his 
real desideratum -- seeking to give rise to a state which, while nominally Jewish, would 
promote the rich cosmopolitan modernism of the Vienna he loved and the other -- albeit 
the dominant one -- leading to a racialist Jews-only state . Understanding this split 
perspective will involve a critical reading of his life and his writings (in particular his 1895 
text Der Judenstaat), but in setting forth this reading I intend to do more than simply 
throw light upon some biographical specificities and textual incompatibilities. In 
particular, in looking into the relation of Herzl to Vienna, Zionism, and his imaginings of 
a Jewish state, I intend critically to assess what led the Zionist project to mirror the anti-
semitism it was designed to counter. Exposing the contradictions and contingencies which 
resulted in Herzl's futurisms giving rise to a state in numerous ways opposed to that which 
he had imagined will, I hope, give support to those, inside and outside the Zionist 'new 
society', who believe that Israel and the Jewish community it claims to represent do not 
need to base Jewish rights and security on the destruction of the rights and lives of others. 
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* * *
There are, of course, methodological problems with treating an individual's life 
and work as somehow emblematic of the culture of a larger collectivity, but in a number of 
ways it seems viable to see Herzl -- whose charismatic figure looms over the Zionist 
Congresses (see Berkowitz 1993) -- as someone who spoke to and for many European 
Jews: 'Herzl's experience was emblematic of that of a large number of central European 
Jews, which is why his resolution of his ambivalence through Zionism resonated so 
powerfully in others of his generation' (Kornberg 1993: 3). That so many identified 
themselves with the scenarios of identity, antagonism and deliverance sketched by Herzl in 
his speeches, his journalistic work, and his famed Der Judenstaat suggests that this 
particular interpellation (Althusser 1971: 160-165) played a substantial role in shaping 
Zionism's earliest forms. Although later articulations of Zionism, for instance those of the 
Labour and Socialist Zionist movements, diverged om and critiqued Herzl's model, I will 
argue that Herzl's programme of creating a 'new Jew' to displace the 'ghetto Jew' remained 
latent in all Zionisms (when it was not overt) and thus that the structure of Herzl's 
identity discourse is paradigmatic for Zionism as a general movement. For this reason I 
want first to consider the conflicts and contradictions which gave rise to Herzl's image of 
Jewish identity and the Zionist project. 
Great strides were taken towards the full assimilation of Jews into mainstream 
European society in the wake of the French Revolution. Although impediments to full 
integration were equently encountered on that path there was a generalized optimism 
throughout central and western European Jewry in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century that assimilation was the inevitable fate of the Jewish people. Most Jews in 
Austria, France, Germany and Great Britain were urbanized and had discarded the cultural 
distinctions which, further to the east, signaled the Jewishness of those confined to 
ghettos in eastern Europe and in and around the Russian 'Pale of Settlement'. For 
5assimilating Jews religion was a private affair (if not an atavism which had no hold on 
them at all) which might be discarded in exchange for the benefits of full incorporation 
into European civilization. Conversions om Judaism to Christianity had increased 
significantly in the nineteenth century, either pragmatically or through intermarriage6. 
Heinrich Heine, who in 1825 became Christian so as to be able to quali for a law degree, 
called baptism an 'entréebillet zur europäischen Kultur' [an 'entrance ticket to European 
civilisation'] and queried 'who would let a mere formality stand between him and 
European civilisation?' (Laqueur 2003: 9)
Herzl, up until the early 1890s, considered himself primarily a journalist and a 
playwright and, while aware of his Jewishness, strove for full incorporation into the 
hegemonic culture of Vienna (to which his family had moved om Budapest when he was 
eighteen). As a law student at the university he belonged to -- and enthusiastically engaged 
with -- two radical German nationalist organizations, the Akademische Lesehalle (Academic 
Reading Hall) and the Albia aternity (a dueling club). Later Herzl identified strongly 
with Vienna's artistic circles, affecting an aristocratic aestheticism as a means of distancing 
himself om the commercial taint of common journalism. Jacques Kornberg, in a 
powerful study of Herzl's ambivalent relation to his Jewishness, argues that these were 
attempts to 'distance himself om his Jewish Hungarian origins' (Kornberg 1993: 49) by 
shedding Jewish traits and becoming part of the 'Germandom' of the surrounding culture7. 
Viennese culture, until the rise of racial nationalism in the 1890s, was both assimilationist 
and anti-semitic; a Jew could 'pass' as a full member of European (Christian) society 
precisely by showing no evidence of what Christian Europeans saw as stereotypical 
'Jewishness'. Herzl identified with the values of that environment, aspiring to be the 'new 
man' of the Enlightenment while sharing its disdain for the stereotypical ghetto Jew whose 
atavistic religiosity and provincialism was antithetical to enlightened cosmopolitanism. 
Herzl's struggle through the 1880s to gain recognition as a literary artist coincided 
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with an increase in populist anti-semitism sparked by financial crisis and fueled by 
accusations that Jewish financiers had corrupted the market. This found resonance in the 
anti-Enlightenment völkisch racial nationalism which was simultaneously emerging 
(Laqueur 2003: 28-30 and Zimmerman 2001: 137-146). Between 1883 -- when he 
withdrew om the Albia association because of its policy shi om promoting the 
assimilation of Jews into the German nation to advocating excluding them as racially alien 
-- and 1895 -- when the election of the anti-semitic Christian Socials to power in the 
Vienna City Council spurred his realization that Jewish emancipation could only take place 
in a Jewish polity -- Herzl worked for recognition as a fully assimilated and successful 
individual against the prejudices which saw him not as a man and an artist but as a 'Jew'. 
Part of his strategy for overcoming prejudice was a discursive splitting of the Jew 
into two distinct personifications. One type of Jew, with which he identified, was the 
enlightened cosmopolitan who carried his Jewishness in the same way an Austrian or a 
Frenchman bore his national origins -- as an evident yet fundamentally irrelevant aspect of 
an all-round educated person deporting himself with grace and self-possession. The other 
Jew, who he loathed and in whom he believed anti-Semites found the font of their 
stereotypes of the Jew, was the Ostjude ('eastern Jew') who dwelled in and had been shaped 
by the ghetto. For Herzl the ghetto Jew -- isolated om participation in European 
national movements as well as om modernization and enlightenment -- had developed a 
self-serving mentality focussed on economic gain and manifest in an obsessive money 
hunger and a self-debasing humility behind which lurked a cra arrogance. Herzl, like 
Freud and other assimilated western Jews8, looked with repulsion upon this Jew who they 
called mauschel (usually rendered into English as 'yid'):
'We've known him for a long time, and just merely to look at him, 
let alone approach or, heaven forbid, touch him was enough to 
make us feel sick. But our disgust, until now, was moderated by 
7pity; we sought extenuating, historical explanations for his being so 
crooked, sleazy, and shabby a specimen. Moreover, we told ourselves 
that he was, aer all, our fellow tribesman, though we had no cause 
to be proud of his fellowship . . . . who is this Yid, anyway? A type, 
my dear iends, a figure that pops up time and again, the dreadful 
companion of the Jew, and so inseparable om him that they have 
always been mistaken for one for the other. The Jew is a human 
being like any other, no better and no worse …. The Yid, on the 
other hand, is a hideous distortion of the human character, 
something unspeakably low and repulsive'9. 
The mauschel was, however, more than a Jewish other for Herzl; it was an antagonist -- 
something which endangered the very ground of his identity by its presence10. The eastern 
Jew, by providing the bases for the stereotypical images with which anti-semites 
legitimated excluding and persecuting all Jews, not only put at risk Herzl's social identity 
and status but also, by sharing a 'tribal' identity with him, subverted at its foundations his 
laboriously achieved sense of self. This dual threat devolved om Herzl's anxiety that 
others, to whom he would present himself as a European, might reject his self-
presentation and reduce him to the Jew he and they despised ('you may think that you are 
like everybody else but you're just a Jew').
Herzl responded to this threat by throwing up barriers - both ontological and 
social - between himself and the mauschel. He rendered foreign the bloodline he saw as 
spawning the mauschel, suggesting that 'at some dark moment in our history some inferior 
human material got into our unfortunate people and blended with it'11. In order to protect 
western Jews om the stigmas arising om being associated with the eastern Jew, Herzl, 
in 1893, proposed to cut the ties of name and religion that associated them. He argued in 
his journalistic work for a mass enlistment of Jews in the project of Austrian socialism 
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which -- nominally anti-semitic in its hostility to Jewish distinctiveness -- would eradicate 
that distinctiveness by making Jewish socialists an integral part of the German culture it 
promoted as a norm for all of Central Europe. He later proposed an even more explicit 
cessation of the stigma of Jewishness by suggesting an orchestrated mass baptism of 
Austrian Jews into the Catholic church (see Pawel 1989: 186-188). The self-deputed last 
generation of Jewish fathers would accompany its sons to the city cathedral where a great 
collective baptism of the latter would take place. In this manner the last Austrian Jews 
would gain the respect of the gentiles as they proudly extinguished their community by 
transforming their sons into full Europeans. The threat posed to the western Jew by the 
mauschel would be obviated by denying the Jewish religion which bound one to the other.
Herzl was finally forced to abandon strategies grounded on confidence that 
Enlightenment Europe would welcome Jews into its community if Jews discarded the 
Jewishness that rendered them distinct when -- aer three decades of Liberal rule -- the 
Christian Socials, an overtly anti-semitic party which had begun its climb to power in the 
previous decade, won a firm majority in the 1895 Vienna city council elections. The 
Christian Socials instituted policies of Catholic revivalism and Jewish exclusion, and Herzl 
(already sensitized by the Dreyfus affair to the resurgent appeal of anti-semitism in 
Europe) was forced to acknowledge that no matter how un-Jewish or un-Mauschel he and 
other Jews would become -- no matter how much they worked to transform themselves to 
effect assimilation -- they would never be allowed to co-exist within European society 
except as ghettoised others barred om entry into the institutions of the dominant 
culture. In the new racial discourse a Jew was a Jew, even when he was a Christian. 
Herzl responded quickly with an elaboration of the fundamentals of the program 
he called Zionism. The speed of invention seems less surprising when it is recognized that 
all Herzl did was to displace the policies of Jewish transformation he'd already developed 
to a site -- any site -- outside of the bounds of a Europe which would not accept them. 
9Herzl's Zionist state was not a state informed by the Jewish religion but a state in which 
Jewish citizens could function as full citizens without suffering exclusionary discrimination 
in any domain of social activity. Herzl in effect argued that as Jews were made 'Jewish' by 
exclusion and Europeans could only see Jewishness when it saw Jews (henceforth insisting 
on maintaining the exclusionary policies that made Jews 'Jewish'), Jews would have to 
leave Europe in order to stop being 'Jewish' and reveal themselves as European. The 
Zionist state, wherever it was to be established, would be a place where Jews could act just 
like -- and thus become just like -- other Europeans12. In the wake of the election which 
tolled the death knell of his ambitions of direct assimilation, Herzl -- still at heart an 
assimilationist -- announced a program for establishing a European state outside of 
Europe: 'In the election the majority of non-Jewish citizens -- no, all of them -- declare 
that they do not recognize us as Austro-Germans. All right, we shall move away; but over 
there too we shall only be Austrians' (Patai 1960: I, 246-247). 
The Jewish state Herzl had in mind was a reconstitution in another place of the 
best elements of pre-Christian Social Viennese society, with Jews making up the citizenry 
and anti-semitism rendered unviable by Jewish 'normalisation'. The geographical 
displacement envisioned in his diaries and his journalism becomes, in the 'New Society' of 
the future, not only spatial but also temporal. Nonetheless, the 'doubling' of pre-1890s 
Vienna evident in his earlier writings continues to be played out in the novel; Herzl's 
image of the New Society of Altneuland is one of idealized pre-anti-semitic Vienna 
projected into a future in which an intellectual vanguard opens the way to prosperity and 
security for all members of a multi-ethnic society. Herzl presents Altneuland as an 
opportunity to try again to create the cosmopolitan enlightenment which the Christian 
Socials and the forces of anti-semitic intolerance sabotaged13. It monumentalizes the 
assimilationist aspiration which drove Herzl's early attempts to dissolve Western Jews into 
the Enlightenment European society which surrounded them. Here the new Jew, modeled 
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on the enlightened Christian European, provides the norm for a social order mirroring 
Europe, if Europe could be imagined as being without anti-semitism. However, although 
in Altneuland anti-semitism is 'le outside' in old Europe, the concept of normalization, so 
central to Herzl's earlier drive towards Jewish assimiliation, internalizes an equivalent 
malignancy in his Der Judenstaat and in so doing introduces a fatal fissure into the 
conception -- and future -- of the Jewish state. The mauschel, haunting and threatening 
Herzl's conception of Jewish assimilation, proves foundational to his idea of a Jewish state 
and, in playing such a fundamental role, divides his concept of the state in two14, sowing 
the seeds for its eventual realisation as a racist ethnocracy. 
* * *
A careful reading of Der Judenstaat reveals -- behind the rhetoric predicting 'a 
great upward tendency [which] will pass through our people' (Herzl 1993: 70) providing 
'ambitious young men…a bright prospect of eedom, happiness and honours' (Herzl 1993: 
9) -- an accompanying scenario intended to overcome the antagonism the eastern Jew 
posed to Herzl and, in his eyes, to Jews in general. For Herzl the exposure of 'Christian 
citizens' (Herzl 1993: 18) to 'wandering Jews' (Ibid), displaced om the ghettos and 
emigrating into countries in which assimilated Jews already peacefully co-exist, 'either 
introduce[s] Anti-Semitism where it does not exist, or intensif[ies] it where it does' (Ibid). 
A Jewish state would eradicate anti-semitism by gathering in and settling these 
'faithful' (Ibid) and 'foreign' (Ibid) Jews. It would isolate eastern Jews -- those provokers 
and amplifiers of anti-semitic feeling -- and, through a carefully rationalized program of 
'relief by labor', use their unremunerated work both to transform them om 'good for 
nothing beggar[s] into…honest bread winner[s]' (Herzl 1993: 39)15 and to render the 
country habitable. Only aer that hard labor of dual transformation had been carried out 
would other Jews even consider leaving Europe and emigrating to Palestine: 
'We shall not leave our old home before the new one is prepared for 
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us. Those only will depart who are sure thereby to improve their 
position; those who are now desperate will go first, aer them the 
poor, next the prosperous, and, last of all, the wealthy. Those who 
go in advance will raise themselves to a higher grade, equal to that 
whose representatives will shortly follow. Thus the exodus will be at 
the same time an ascent of the classes' (Herzl 1993: 20).
The plan for a Jewish state was thus a plan to quarantine eastern Jews om their nominal 
western 'brethren' and, through that isolation and a well-regimented regime of work and 
social engineering, to raise them gradually to the 'level' of assimilated western Jews. This 
process would sweat om them, and later om the Jewish parvenu who had brought the 
stench of the market into the drawing rooms of the western Jewish 'aristocracy' (see 
Kornberg 1993: 71-76), all traces of the ghetto. 
It is indicative that this labor of human and spatial transformation is elided in 
Altneuland, where a twenty year gap falls between Kingscourt's and Loewenberg's first 
viewing of 'the ancient land of the Jews' -- 'dirty and neglected, full of motley oriental 
misery [where] [p]oor Turks, dirty Arabs and shy Jews lounged around' (Herzl 1960: 30) 
and their return to a 'marvellously changed' (Ibid: 42) Palestine filled with people 'more 
civilized' (Ibid) than they. The masking of this immense labor -- which Herzl is at pains 
to detail in the earlier Der Judenstaat -- suggests that the Palestine of the state building 
project of that text, and that of Altneuland, may not at all be the same country. The utopic 
character of the 'New Society' of Altneuland is implied in Der Judenstaat's indication that 
Western Jews will, in effect, have no reason to emigrate to the redeemed Palestine:
'The movement towards the organisation of the State I am 
proposing would, of course, harm Jewish Frenchmen no more than 
it would harm the "assimilated" of other countries. It would, on the 
contrary, be distinctly to their advantage. For they would no longer 
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be disturbed in their "chromatic function"16, as Darwin puts it, but 
would be able to assimilate in peace, because the present Anti-
semitism would have been stopped for ever….They would be rid of 
the disquieting, incalculable, and unavoidable rivalry of a Jewish 
proletariat, driven by poverty and political pressure om place to 
place, om land to land. This floating proletariat would become 
stationary' (Ibid).
The future Jewish state would not affect fully assimilated Jews at all, except to ee them 
om the curse of anti-semitism; some might choose, as members of a wealthy elite, to 
emigrate to Palestine once it had been fully developed while others, like the 'Jewish 
Frenchmen' described above, 'would certainly be credited with being assimilated to the very 
depths of their souls if they stayed where they were aer the new Jewish state, with its 
superior institutions, had become a reality' (Herzl 1993: 18). Aer all, anti-semitism 
would, in Herzl's scenario, disappear with the disappearance of that which provoked it. 
Herzl's project would eliminate the last barrier to Jewish emancipation and assimilation by 
exterminating the mauschel, by transformation or worse: 
'In our own day, even a flight om religion can no longer rid the 
Jew of the Yid. Race is now the issue - as if the Jew and the Yid 
belonged to the same race. But go and prove that to the anti-
Semite. To him, the two are always and inextricably linked….And 
then came Zionism!….We'll breathe more easily, having got rid once 
and for all of these people whom, with furtive shame, we were 
obliged to treat as our fellow tribesmen….Watch out, Yid. Zionism 
might proceed like Wilhelm Tell…and keep a second arrow in 
reserve. Should the first shot miss, the second will serve the cause of 
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vengeance. Friends, Zionism's second arrow will pierce the Yid's 
chest'17.
Herzl's plan to establish a Jewish state outside of Europe seems, at first glance, to 
promise Jews -- blocked within Europe om becoming fully European by the racism of 
the new nationalist anti-semitisms -- a place in which they can develop their full human 
(read 'European') potential without impediment. A closer reading reveals that while it 
appears to be a design for the eventual abolition of anti-semitism, it is in itself profoundly 
anti-semitic, blaming the 'Jewish' characteristics of one sector of the 'Jewish' population 
for the hatred of the Jews felt by non-Jews. Not only does Herzl see Jewishness through 
the eyes of the anti-semitic non-Jew18, but he also contends that anti-semitism can only be 
extinguished by exterminating those Jewish characteristics (and if necessary their bearers) 
which provoke it. Behind the abstract image of the Jewish state as a machinery for 
constructing a new humanity via an 'ascent of the classes' lurks a concrete plan for a 
detention camp which, via the forced labor of draining the malarial swamps and otherwise 
redeeming the land19, might bio-engineer a new Jew out of the coarse old Jew of the shtetls 
of Eastern Europe and the slums of the West. 
Herzl was an Austrian who wanted to remain Austrian in Austria and conceived, in 
the face of rising anti-semitism, that the only way of so doing was to abolish anti-
semitism. Instead, however, of challenging anti-semitism at the core of its logic (as, for 
instance, Sartre does in Anti-Semite and Jew), Herzl accepted that anti-semites were 
justified in their loathing of the 'all-too-Jewish' ostjude (a loathing he himself, like many 
assimilated Western Jews, shared) and proposed to end anti-semitism by disappearing the 
ostjude. In at least the short term the purpose of the state he proposed to establish was to 
gather, hold, and remake the mauschel. The New Society envisaged in Altneuland would 
have to wait until that work of reformation was completed, if it were not in fact to take 




Herzl's charisma, and the appeal to both Western and Eastern European Jews of 
his vision of an extra-European Jewish state untroubled by anti-semitism, enabled him to 
play a leading role in the articulation of the Zionist program which would evolve into the 
Labor Zionism of the founding fathers of the state of Israel. Insofar as the activists of the 
Zionist Congresses were not looking to practice their 'chromatic function' in Europe but 
were anxious to lay the foundations both of a new state and a new Jewry, they 
enthusiastically adopted the project of aliyah and the colonial settlement of Palestine. 
Herzl, although profoundly disappointed by a visit to Palestine in 1898 (Laqueur 2003: 
110), fervently embraced the leadership of the movement despite its goals being somewhat 
disjunct om his own20. In part because of the significant and increasing contribution of 
Russian Jews to the early Zionist congresses21, the explicit focus on the ostjude was 
dropped, but what remained central to the project was the extirpation of the 'Old Jew' and 
the creation, through manual labor and secular education, of the muscular 'New Zionist 
Man' (Berkowitz 1993: 99-118).
Zionism, as elaborated by Herzl and adopted by the Zionist movement, grounded 
modern Jewish identity on two platforms: one was recognition of the anti-semitism which 
prevented Jewish assimilation into the European mainstream and the other was the project 
of abolishing the pre-modern 'Jewishness' which spurred that anti-semitism. Both of 
those supports to identity were imported into the Jewish state founded in Israel although, 
as in Herzl's own program, the policy of rooting out of the 'old Jew' took precedence. The 
pre-state Zionist cadres that settled in Palestine before 1948 fervently worked to dig out 
the remnants of 'atavistic' practices, beliefs and deportment. Contemporaneously the Nazis 
and their sympathizers exterminated most of remaining ostjuden practices by the systematic 
genocide of Jewish populations in Poland, Russian and other regions of Eastern and 
Central Europe. While to a large degree the original focus of the program had disappeared 
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by the time Israel was founded, modernization remained a central platform of the new 
state. This was manifest in educational policies such as the ulpans' program of eradicating 
Yiddish and replacing it with Hebrew, but it was most evident in policies towards 
communities that came to be seen as equivalent to the ostjuden -- those of the Jews of the 
Arab world.
Israel, in the early years of its existence, endeavored to ‘gather’ Jews om their 
worldwide diaspora, but particular attention was paid to Jews who had lived - in some 
cases for millennia - in the countries of the Middle East. Some of these were Sephardim - 
Jews originally om Spain who, aer its fieenth century reconquesta and its attendant 
religious ‘purification’, had been scattered throughout North Aica - while others were 
Mizrachim - Jews who had, in many cases since the time of the Babylonian exile, lived in 
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, and as far afield as Ethiopia. Israel worked out various ways of 
bringing these ‘eastern Jews’ out of their natal countries and into the new world in which 
they were to be transformed into Israelis; in some cases it negotiated population transfers 
by economic and political trade and in others, as with Iran and Iraq, it organized covert 
activities to promote emigration amongst communities loathe to leave22. When these 
people arrived in Israel, oen in mass population transfers, they were treated as mauschel - 
Jews with no sense of modernity, of identity, of civilisation - and the state immediately set 
in train processes of remaking them over as 'modern' Jews23. Yet they were not what 
modernizing Zionism needed them to be. Wrenched out of societies in which they had 
oen belonged to well-integrated, sophisticated and relatively wealthy urban elites, they 
were plunged into state-orchestrated collective projects designed to transform them into 
something approximating the pathetic, unsophisticated and uncivilised anachronisms the 
modernizing project needed as raw material. Giladi provides a transcript of an interview 
with an Iraqi woman brought to Israel in 1948 which expresses this process, and the 
violence it entailed, succinctly:
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‘We were wearing our Sabbath clothing. We thought as the plane 
landed that Israel would welcome us warmly. But goodness how 
wrong we were. When the plane had landed at Lod airport, a 
worker approached us and sprayed us all over with DDT, as if we 
were lice-infested. What sort of welcome was that? We thought 
they were spitting in our faces. When we disembarked om the 
plane, they herded us into a train, which was so crowded that we 
were stepping on each other and our fine clothes were dirtied. My 
husband was crying and so was I. Then the children started crying 
and our sobs went up to heaven and cast a pall over the train. Since 
it was a eight train it had no electric light, but as it sped along we 
thought of the death trains which had taken European Jews to the 
Nazi camps. Finally we reached the “Sha‘ar Ha‘aliya” camp and we 
were taken in with other families, then they wrote down our names 
and “gave” us new Hebrew names. “Said” became “Hayyim”, “Su’ad” 
became “Tamar”, and I was renamed “Ahuva” and so on' (Giladi 
1990: 103)24.
This treatment of non-Ashkenazi Jews would eventually backfire, producing political and 
communal solidarities around the rage non-European Jews felt at being discriminated 
against and denigrated on the grounds of their cultural and religious beliefs and practices. 
The growing influence of such alliances has not only led to very different politics aer 
Labor lost power in 1977 but has also placed 'Israeli identity' in question, revealing the 
state as composed of a series of discrete, oen mutually antagonistic, constituencies.
The problematic agmentation of Jewish identity in the wake of the politicisation 
of non-Ashkenazi Israelis, in particular immigrants om Morocco, not only curtailed the 
project of Jewish transformation which was so central to Herzl's project but also raised real 
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questions about, to borrow a phrase om Israeli discourse, 'who is a Jew?' If Israel was to 
be made up, on the one hand, of secularized Jews who, in abandoning traditional culture 
(including all but the formal vestiges of religion) had become indistinguishable om 
Europeans (and Americans) and, on the other, of others whose powerful assertions of 
distinct cultural and religious identities rendered them antagonistic to the core tenets of 
the Zionist project, then the meaning of the 'Jewish' in 'Jewish state' was thrown into 
radical contention25. Friedland and Hecht's ethnography of the 'civil war' between 
Orthodox and secular Jews in Jerusalem shows that what is at stake in this dispute over the 
meaning of Jewish might be the survival of a collectivity called 'Jewish' (Friedland, 1996).
The 'solution' adopted has proved to be a shi of focus om the creation of the 
'new Jew' to an emphasis on anti-semitism as the negativity which, in effect, constitutes a 
Jewish positivity. While Zionism's initial project had at its core a problematic 
internalization of Austro-Hungarian racism, it nonetheless attempted to counter anti-
semitism with a work of communal modernization meant to make possible eventual 
assimilation into the Enlightenment project. The contemporary enactment of Zionism 
abandons that transformative project, essentializing Jewishness as 'that which suffers anti-
semitism' and establishing as its central project the proof of a omnipresent and threatening 
antagonism. In part this is evidenced in the increasing amplification of public assertions by 
the state and its agencies that Jews, wherever they live in the modern world, are subject to 
an ever rising tide of anti-semitic persecution which can only be countered by a retreat 
behind the protective walls of the Jewish state (see Bowman 2009: 300-302). More 
virulent, and more salient to the topic of this book, is the escalating demonization -- and 
provocation -- of Palestinians within Israel and the Occupied Territories and Arab 
populations in the surrounding nations.
* * *
It is interesting, and symptomatic, that despite Altneuland's wonderfully civilised 
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Rachid Bey there was never any real attempt, in the realized Zionist state, to assimilate 
Palestinian Arabs into the New Society. From the earliest days of the Zionist project 
Palestinians were meant to exist outside the Jewish collectivity, even if they were allowed 
to remain within the erstwhile (though never declared) borders of the state26. Thus, for 
instance, Ben Gurion's policy of avodah ivrit ('Hebrew labor'), elaborated early in the 
second aliyah, that demanded that Jewish property not be worked by non-Jews (despite 
this the Israeli economy was dependent on Palestinian labour right up until the Oslo 
Accords)27. Thus too the uncanny phantom position aer 1948 of nokhehim nifkadim or 
'present absentees' (Piterberg 2001: 42-43), who were Palestinians living within Israel 
without legal status (or rights). Debates within the Foreign Office, which dealt with 
'Internal Refugees', centered in the early 1950s on whether these 'phantoms' should simply 
be forced to emigrate or subjected to what Alexander Dotan, chair of the Advisory 
Committee on Refugees, described as 'a secular Jewish cultural mission' (quoted by 
Piterberg 2001: 45) to make them over as non-Jewish Jews, obliterating any Palestinian 
identity and rendering them culturally, but not juridically, assimilable. Although Dotan 
rhetorically linked his plan to the policies of assimilation employed with Jewish newcomers 
-- talking of using education policies like those of the ma'abarot or transition camps built 
for Jewish immigrants -- it was in fact designed not to assimilate Palestinians but to 
neutralize and render them invisible. It was nonetheless overruled by Josh Palmon, Ben-
Gurion's advisor on Arab affairs, who, with the aim of impelling 'Arabs' to emigrate, 
perpetuated the harsh military regime established aer the war until 196⒍
While anyone who could be considered 'Jewish' was grist for the modernizing mill 
of the Jewish state, Herzl's and the founding fathers' conceptions of the Jew -- which 
vacillated between being defined as a racially distinct entity and one constituted by anti-
semitism -- meant that in the early decades of the state non-Jews within it were in effect 
incidental and, functionally, invisible. Palestinians were quarantined outside the national 
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project, kept before 1967 in what were in militarily sealed village ghettos om whence 
they might get permission to exit to provide labor for Jewish businesses and kibbutzim (see 
Lustick 1980). Aer the 1967 war and the consolidation of the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation under the leadership of Fatah Palestinians -- on the outside -- began to play 
a more significant role as an external antagonism which could be shown to be, in large part 
for external international consumption, a threat to the survival of the Jewish state and thus 
a reason it should receive substantial international and diasporic support (Israel, before the 
first intifada, shared the PLO's disdain of the 'inside', monitoring it for dissent while 
mining it for markets and labor).
It is only in the wake of the 1977 elections and the burgeoning of the identity 
politics of Israel's newly politicized Jewish constituencies that the Palestinians within the 
borders of the territories Israel claims as its own have come to play a significant role in the 
nation's conception of its self. The collapse of the Zionist project of making the 'new 
Jew' (a collapse brought about in part by its success and in part by its generation of 
antagonistic 'other' identities) threatened Israeli Jewish identity itself with collapse -- a 
collapse which could render the national project unviable. The solution has been to draw 
Jews within the borders of Israel as well as in the Diaspora together defensively in the face 
of what they are told are ever present threats to their personal and collective survival as 
Jews. In the absence of a convincing external enemy (with European and American anti-
semitism in serious decline, the PLO driven out of Jordan and Lebanon, and the 
surrounding Arab states stilled by treaty or internal crisis) the Palestinians 'inside' had to 
be demonized. The first intifada, in which the Israeli military was unable successfully to 
repress a popular uprising, revealed the 'phantom' Palestinian population as more powerful 
than had been assumed and led to the first moves -- initially effected by Oslo -- to bring 
all Palestinians, including the PLO cadres who 'returned' om Tunisia and Yemen, 
together behind checkpoints within Gaza and the West Bank. Subsequent policies have in 
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large part functioned as provocations -- increased land confiscations and house 
demolitions, massively expanded settlement programs, targeted assassinations and 
widescale arrests, desecrations of religious sites (the Ibrahimi Mosque and the Haram es-
Sharif ), failure to fulfill treaty obligations, etc. -- meant to ensure that Jews are constantly 
aware of the rage of Palestinians and their non-Palestinian supporters -- a rage that, by 
being defined as anti-semitic, clearly defines a Jewish 'us' opposed by an ever-expanding 
field of 'them'.
I am arguing, perhaps counter-intuitively, that current Israeli practices of 
surveillance, control and walling are not meant to protect the Jewish civilians and state 
institutions om attack by a hostile non-Jewish population, but more vitally to protect 
Jewish identity, and the state which has founded itself on it, om dissolution om within. 
By 'encysting' Palestinians -- quarantining them in enclaves as '"matter" held to put the 
surrounding social body at risk' (Bowman 2009: 295) -- Israel stages for its own 
population a continuous performance of threat on their own doorsteps, forcing that 
population to huddle defensively together despite its own radical heterogeneity, while 
simultaneously guaranteeing that the contained and curtailed Palestinians (and their 
supporters) produce dramatic yet relatively impotent gestures of resistance. Any 
questioning of state policies, and of the politics of fear, om within the Jewish community 
is deemed treasonous because suicidal, and can only be the result of Jewish self-hatred; 
criticizing Israel om 'outside' is viewed as simply and purely anti-semitic. All of these 
attacks serve to forti further the walls the Jewish state and its 'supporters' have thrown 
up around an essentialized, and finally incohesive, Jewish community. Herzl might be 
shocked to see that his Altneuland has become, to borrow the title of another of his works, 
Das Neue Ghetto (The New Ghetto), but he is not absolved of culpability. 
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². 'It was one of the most strongly held beliefs of early Zionists that Jewish settlement in 
Palestine, regardless of the dispossession, would be to the benefit of Jews and Arabs 
alike' (Rose 2005: 61).
³. Sunday Times, 1969-06-15
⁴. Peters 1984, see for a critique Finkelstein 198⒏
⁵. Leonhard wrote that 'Altneuland was written primarily for the world, not for Zionists. It 
had propagandistic aims; Herzl wanted to win over non-Jewish opinion for Zionism'
(Leonhard 1971 [orig. 1960]: 119).
⁶. See Laqueur 2003: 3-39 on intermarriage and integration in western and central Europe.
⁷. see Kornberg 1993: 46-51 on German nationalism and 60-66 on aesthetic culture.
⁸. Freud, in a letter to Fluss of 18 September 1872, described an a family of ostjude he'd 
recently seen (he refers to their accent as mauscheln): 'he was cut om the cloth which fate 
makes swindlers when the time is ripe: cunning, mendacious, kept by his adoring relatives 
in the belief that he is a great talent, but unprincipled and without character….I have 
enough of this lot. Madame Jewess and family hailed om Meseritsch: the proper 
compost heap for this sort of weed' (quoted in Gilman 1993: 13, see also Laqueur 2003: 
56-61 and Kornberg 1993: 22-24). Even Bernard Lazare, who subsequently was to take a 
stance against the Jewish state project, referred in 1894 in L'Antisémitisme to 'these coarse 
and dirty, pillaging Tatars, who come to feed upon a country which does not belong to 
them' (quoted in Piterberg 2008: 6).
⁹. Herzl, "Mauschel" in Die Welt, 15 October 1897, quoted by Pawel 1989: 34⒌
¹⁰. The concept of antagonism, drawn originally om Hegel, is productively developed by 
Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985: 95-148).
¹¹. Herzl, "Mauschel" in Zionist Writings: Essays and Addresses, Vol. I, pp. 163-165; quoted 
by Kornberg 1993: 164).
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¹². As opposed to Russian movements, which contended that when Jews gathered together 
as self-sustaining groups a real and undistorted Jewish spirit would emerge, Herzl's 
Zionism contended that the state -- operating according to principles mapped out for it by 
an enlightened minority -- would shape a new Jew: 'the notion that Jewish faults stemmed 
om their exclusion om the political sphere and could be cured by full citizenship was a 
keystone of this ideology' (Kornberg 1993: 161 ).
¹³. That the Jewish nationalist Geyer brings anti-semitism (directed at that other semitic 
population -- the Palestinians) back onto the scene as a threat to the well-being of the 
community emphasizes the parallels between Vienna in the 1880s and the future Jewish 
state (as in fact does the oxymoronic title 'Old New Land'). 
¹⁴. The play of meaning between the two possible translations of Der Judenstaat -- 'the 
Jewish state' and 'the state of the Jews' -- may here have unintentional significance.
¹⁵. The policy of unpaid labor of the Jewish Company (that agency charged with 
developing the inastructure of the coming state) ensures that the worst traits of the 
mauschel will be extinguished: 'The company will thus make it impossible om the outset 
for those of our people, who are perforce hawkers and pedlars here, to re-establish 
themselves in the same trades over there. And the company will also keep back drunkards 
and dissolute men' (Herzl 1993: 37). 'Redemption through labor' was a major plank of 
Zionism evident, for instance, in the central tenet of Poale Zion, the Russian Zionist 
movement that only a return to the soil could redeem the Jewish people. For the Jews of 
the Second Aliya, the first Zionist emigration to Palestine (1904-1906), 'manual 
labour…was not a necessary evil but an absolute moral value, a remedy to cure the Jewish 
people of its social and national ills' (Laqueur 2003: 281).
¹⁶. 'Chromatic function', the Darwinian conception of adaptive mimicry, was a topic of 
contemporary debate and discussion; Nietzsche in 1881 writes of how 'animals learn to 
master themselves and alter their form, so that many, for example, adapt their colouring to 
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the colouring of their surroundings (by virtue of the so-called "chromatic function"), 
pretend to be dead or assume the forms and colours of another animal or of sand, leaves, 
lichen, fungus (what English researchers designate "mimicry"). Thus the individual hides 
himself in the general concept "man", or in society' (Nietzsche 1982: 20). 
¹⁷. Herzl, "Mauschel" in Die Welt, 15 October 1897, quoted by Pawel 1989: 34⒍
¹⁸. Here mimicking the anti-semitic attitude to Jews to the extent of racially othering the 
ostjuden by attributing their negative qualities to the result of miscegenation with some 
'inferior human material'. He also, as his comments on 'chromatic function' make clear, 
accepts that Jews, as an integral entirety, are racially distinct om other Europeans. 
¹⁹. See Sufian's Healing the Land and the Nation (Sufian 2007) for a richly researched study 
of this dually redemptive process.
²⁰.  Laqueur, following Schorske, believes that 'the narcissistic streak in his character 
played a great part in it. Herzl relished the role of Messiah-King which he was to assume 
in the years to come' (Laqueur 2003: 97). Max Nordau's insistence on the democratic 
assemblies of the Zionist Congresses weakened the impact of his specific programmatic 
positions without reducing his role as figurehead of the movement. 
²¹. 'Of great importance for the future of the movement was his meeting with the 
representatives of Russian Jewry, who with seventy delegates had constituted the strongest 
contingent [of the First Zionist Congress of 1897] in Basle. Herzl was impressed by the 
calibre of these men, of whose existence, with very few exceptions, he had been only dimly 
aware' (Laqueur 2003: 107 , see also 112-113 on the growth of the Russian Zionist 
movement by the Fourth Congress of August 1900).
²². See Giladi 1990 and Gat 2000 for differing views on the character of this activity.
²³. See, on these communities and their treatment on arrival in Israel, Alcalay 1993: 37-59, 
Bowman 2002: 461-463, Giladi 1990, and Swirski 198⒐
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²⁴. Compare Herzl om Der Judenstaat on the reception into the Jewish state of new 
immigrants: ‘Clothing, underlinen, and shoes will first of all be manufactured for our own 
poor emigrants, who will be provided with new suits of clothing at the various European 
emigration centres….Even the new clothing of the poor settlers will have a symbolic 
meaning. “You are now entering on a new life”' (Herzl 1993: 46).
²⁵. see Golden on dilemmas raised in representing Israel in Tel Aviv's Museum of the 
Jewish Diaspora: 'how many "facets" can be contained within one culture before it 
becomes two or three or indeed as many cultures as the "facets" themselves?' (Golden, 
1996: 237).
26 As early as June 1895 Theodor Herzl wrote in his diary regarding the indigenous 
population: ‘The private lands in the territories granted us we must gradually take out of 
the hands of the owners. The poorer amongst the population we try to transfer quietly 
outside our borders by providing them with work in the transit countries, but in our 
country we deny them all work. Those with property will join us. The transfer of land and 
the displacement of the poor must be done gently and carefully. Let the landowners 
believe they are exploiting us by getting overvalued prices. But no lands shall
be sold back to their owners’ (cited by Hanegbi, Machover and Orr 1971: 14)
²⁷. Initially (1907) this exclusionary labor policy was meant to apply only to lands owned by 
the Jewish National Fund, but by 1920 Ben Gurion was calling for its extension to the 
entire economy (see Shafir 1996: 78-90).
